Crypto locker worm6/26/2023 With the time it takes and API “noise” involved and risk of the adversaries' AWS account being discovered by copying and deleting objects, the adversary will more than likely simply use PutBucketLifecycleConfiguration to delete all objects in a bucket including delete markers for object versioning. Also, CopyObject is limited to objects only 5GB in size, so unlikely an adversary would use this method. The problem with that is the KMS key needs to exist in an AWS account, and you could simply create an abuse case with AWS that another account has accessed your account without authorization and they would investigate. The adversary could use the CopyObject action to simply copy the object and enable encryption with a KMS encryption key. Malware cannot be run in S3, instead adversaries need to use the API to manipulate the objects and buckets using your credentials. In S3 objects cannot be modified in place, only copied or deleted. Normally with ransomware on a traditional file system the file (called an object in S3) is simply encrypted in place by malware, and the adversary keeps the decryption key (if you’re lucky!). Also S3 does not run on a computer that can be compromised by malware. This puts the focus on how you manage credentials (see next section), and how you configure permissions. S3 can only be accessed by the S3 API, and every API action (Put/Get/Delete etc) needs to be authenticated. Ransomware in S3 is different than a traditional computer or server with a file system. In this post I’ll cover how ransomware can work in S3, and a few simple steps for you to help protect your data from ransomware. Like every other storage system on the planet it’s unfortunately not immune to ransomware attacks. Amazon Web Services (AWS) Simple Storage Service (S3) is incredibly durable, secure by default, and feature rich.
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